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Abstract 
Like most of the Western-Balkan countries, the Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of 
Macedonia experienced significant difficulties in adapting and modernizing its 
agricultural production in accordance to the highly competitive regional and EU 
markets. By examining the dairy value chain of the FYR Macedonia, this thesis 
presents the challenges and changes in the organizational and institutional setting of the 
agri-food value chains in post-socialist Balkan countries. Various theoretical 
approaches are applied to assess the competitiveness levels on each segment in the 
industry, as well as to characterize the institutional environment, the governance and 
the organizational structure, and the overall level of development and competitive 
prospects. A general conclusion of this thesis is that the dairy industry in FYR 
Macedonia is still under its competitive potentials. The institutional setting and 
governance, as well the organization of the chain, and the market structure and level of 
modernization, indicate that the dairy industry in the country requires further 
modernization and consolidation in order to reach its competitiveness potentials on 
both domestic and international markets. 
The findings of this study are valuable for the actors in the dairy supply chain, since 
they provide information of each actor’s position in the supply chain, the market 
structure, and the development of the chain in general. Two main contributions of this 
study are the analysis of contracts and the social network, both based on primary data 
collected from farmers in the FYR Macedonia. The analysis of contractual 
arrangements with dairies shows that transaction costs are main determinants of the 
choice of contracts. The analysis of the Social Network, in which the patterns of 
activation of social capital can contribute to finding a solution to the problems with the 
functioning of the farm associations and cooperatives in countries with similar 
socialistic background. The conclusions of these studies can be extended to other 
countries wedged in a long transition, and could easily transfer to the experiences in the 
countries from the Western Balkan region. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1  Background 
In the process of transition, post-socialist, Western Balkan
1
 countries faced 
many difficulties in adapting and modernizing their agricultural production to 
the highly competitive regional and EU markets (Murray, 2006; Lampiet et al., 
2009). The disruption of the existing system caused malfunctions on 
institutional and organizational level, significantly impeding the progress of 
their economies, thus the transition processes were gradual and slow. As part 
of the Western Balkan (WB), the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
2
 
(FYR Macedonia) experienced significant institutional changes from its 
independency in 1991, as well as adjustments to EU regulation, as a candidate 
country for the EU from 2005. However, with the transitional processes lasting 
for over two decades, there is still much uncertainty regarding the institutional 
and legal framework in the country. With the collapse of the socialist system, 
the existent relations that regulated transactions in the agricultural value chains 
were dismantled. The large agricultural companies (agro-kombinats
3
) were 
privatized, causing further segmentation on all levels of the value chains, and 
restraining the agro-food processing capacities (Lampietti et al., 2009)  
Nevertheless, small-scale farms characterized farming during the whole period 
of communist collectivization which was also the case in one other post-
socialist country, Poland (Dries and Swinnen, 2004). 
                                                        
 
1
 The Western Balkan region includes most of the countries from the Ex-Yugoslavian Federation 
(FYR Macedonia, Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo) and Albania 
(Volk et al., 2012). 
2
 The country’s reference within the United Nations system is “Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia” (FYROM) (UNSC Resolution 817/1993). The constitutional name is the Republic of 
Macedonia.    
3
 Large vertically integrated agricultural companies from the former socialist system. 
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The agricultural sector in FYR Macedonia is no different to the experience in 
most WB countries. On one hand it provides opportunities in terms of factor 
endowments such as favourable climate and natural resources for agricultural 
production, cheap labour force, and proximity to EU. But on the other it 
encounters excess of labour force, highly dependent on agriculture and small-
scale farms on the edge of their subsistence (Lampietti et al., 2009). In terms of 
its importance for the economy, the agricultural sector in WB countries 
contributes significantly, with a gross domestic product (GDP) from around 
10% in FYR Macedonia and Serbia, to 21% in Albania for the period from 
2005 to 2012 (FAO, 2014). The share of agricultural employment in these 
countries is also noticeable. FYR Macedonia has a share of 19% of the total 
employed population in agriculture, which is amongst the highest in the region
4
 
(FAO, 2014). The largest problem of the agricultural production in the region 
is the farm structure, which in these countries is small scaled and fragmented.  
In FYR Macedonia, the average farm-size is 1.85 ha per household, however, 
58% of the total farms belonging to the category of farms with less than 1 ha of 
agricultural land (FAO, 2014). Similar farm sizes are seen in Albania with 1.2 
ha per farm, around 3 ha per farm in Bosnia & Herzegovina and less than 4 ha 
per farm in Serbia (Volk et al., 2012). The small scaled farming often implies 
to primitive technology, limited access to resources as well as higher costs for 
transacting and market failures manifested in many of the WB countries 
(Kostov and Lingard, 2004). Additionally because of farmers’ past experience 
with state-induced, non-voluntary cooperation, social capital among the rural 
population was damaged, leaving farmers with general distrust towards any 
type of formal type cooperation, and a tendency of distrust in the state 
(Chloupkova, et al., 2003). This is reflected in the fact that there are only few 
farmers’ organizations in the country and no dairy cooperative at the period 
that this research was conducted in (MAFWE, 2012).  
In the case of dairy farming, besides the small farm size of 1-5 cows per 
farm, dairy farms in FYR Macedonia still use primitive farming techniques and 
instruments, considerably limiting their productivity and 
competitive/bargaining position, as well as their possibilities for growth 
(MAFWE, 2013). Milk is the most important animal product, participating 
with 46.7% of the value of animal output, and around 11% of the total 
agricultural output in 2012 (SSO, 2014). However, the milk yields of 3,099 
kg/cow in 2013 are close to the WB countries average
5
 (which are the 
                                                        
 
4
 The highest share of the employment in the agriculture is seen in Albania - around 55% of the 
total employment in the country (FAO, 2014). 
5
 Lower yields are seen only in Bosnia & Herzegovina and Albania.  
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country’s major trading partner for milk and dairy products), but much lower 
than the EU-27 average (close to 6,700 kg/cow in 2011) (Eurostat, 2013).  
Similar to the segmentation at the farm level, there is also segmentation in 
the down-stream in the value chain. The privatization of the agro-kombinats, 
lead to splitting up in the processing and retailing and disintegration of the 
relations and governance structures of the transactions along the dairy value 
chain. However, unlike dairy farming, and besides the fact that there are 77 
registered dairies in 2013 (MAFWE, 2012) and food shops in the retail sector, 
the level of concentration is relatively high both in the dairy processing and 
retailing segment of the value chains. The situation in this segment of the dairy 
value chain varies in the WB and especially in FYR Macedonia’s major 
importing partners. In Slovenia, an ex-Yugoslav and present EU country of 
similar size and number of inhabitants, there are only seven milk processing 
companies (Van Berkum, 2007). Croatia, with twice the number of 
inhabitants/consumers
6
, has 40 dairies. Serbia provides 8 million consumers 
through 200 dairies (Muminovic and Pavlovic, 2012). For all these countries, 
the most important role in the restructuring processes of their dairy industries 
was played by Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). For example, in FYR 
Macedonia, two of the three largest dairy processors are acquired and are part 
of large food groups such as the Danube Food Group and Lactalis. Four of the 
largest dairies in Bosnia & Herzegovina have foreign capital in their ownership 
structure. The same is the case in Croatia and Serbia (Danube Food Group), in 
which the largest dairy processing companies are also owned by the same 
foreign investors (Van Berkum, 2009). The recent trends in the dairy industries 
on regional level point to an increased tendency of investments and 
consolidation. From FYR Macedonia’s perspective, the effect of FDI on 
regional level can not only be seen in the market concentration, but also 
through the constantly increasing trend of imports of UHT (Ultra-heat 
treatment) milk from these countries. Bosnia & Herzegovina has the largest 
share of 53% followed by Croatia with 18% of the total UHT milk imports in 
the country.  
However, FDI in fragile political and business environments can sometimes 
transmit negative effects to the sectors and the economy. An example of such 
effect is reflected by the case of the Swedmilk dairy. This was the only green-
field investment in the dairy industry in FYR Macedonia. The Swedmilk dairy 
bankrupted after only one year of operation, mostly because of opportunistic 
behavior by the investing partners, enabled by the institutional deficiencies in 
                                                        
 
6
 FYR Macedonia – 2.11 million inhabitants; Slovenia – 2.06 million inhabitants 
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the sector and the country. The event caused a chain reaction, with long-term 
negative consequences for the dairy value chain in the country.  
The economy of the FYR Macedonia is undergoing intensive restructuring. 
Similarly, the country’s dairy value chain is in the process of transition. A 
systematic representation of the institutional environment, the governance 
structures, and the organization of the dairy value chain, can provide valuable 
insights to both the actors of the chain, and policy makers. It is timely to study 
and to enhance our understanding of the reasons behind the chain’s inability to 
reach its competitive potential, and to investigate directions for the future 
development and adaptation. 
1.2 Aim of the thesis 
The overall aim of this thesis is to examine the organization and institutional 
constraints of the dairy value chain in FYR Macedonia, which obstructed the 
restructuring, the institutional development as well as its competitive position 
and potential for growth.  
Specifically, the objectives of this thesis are to: 
I Examine the market structure and patterns of restructuring of the dairy 
value chain in FYR Macedonia, in order to ascertain its level of 
development and competitive position.  
II Analyze the choice of contract arrangements in transition countries, faced 
with institutional underdevelopment and inefficiencies of the legal 
framework.   
III Investigate the importance of social capital on the structure of informal 
social networks of dairy farmers in FYR Macedonia. 
IV Assess the impact of the business and institutional environment on the FDI 
outcomes, using the bankruptcy case of the Swedmilk dairy in FYR 
Macedonia as a characteristic case.  
In paper I the problems of the industry are approached by describing the 
business environment and competitiveness characteristics of the dairy industry, 
and certain features of the market structure. Value chain approach is used to 
capture the fact that the competitiveness of one stage inevitably influences the 
competitive potentials for the remaining actors in the chain, and also the 
competitiveness of the industry in general.  
The aim of Paper II is to provide empirical evidence on the transaction cost 
dimensions which influence the contacting decisions in post-socialist countries. 
Or more specifically, the choice whether to have formal contracts governing 
the transaction between the dairy farmers and their transacting partners/dairy 
processors, or not.  
13 
In paper III, patterns of informal social structures i.e. the networks of dairy 
farmers in FYR Macedonia are studied in order to see if these structures can be 
used for more efficient informational flow as well as improvement of farmer’s 
competitive position in the value chain.  
The purpose of paper IV is to provide an illustration of the institutional 
setting and deficiencies, through the case of the bankrupt green-field FDI 
investment – the “Swedmilk” dairy. 
In the next Sections the overall theoretical framework and methodology 
underpinning the research in this dissertation is provided.  
  
14 
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2 Theoretical framework 
In describing how the institutional setting influenced the development 
processes and the competitive position of the dairy value chain in FYR 
Macedonia, this thesis incorporates different institutional and organizational 
theories. The aim is to capture the problems that hold back the development 
and modernization of the dairy value chain, approaching it from theoretical 
perspectives. The theoretical framework is presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical framework 
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The theories which are used in each of the papers are presented in Figure 1, 
and further elaborated in sections 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 of the thesis. The 
literature is presented in the way thought to approach the aim of this thesis in 
the most logical manner. First, in order to give an overview on the 
organizational constraints of the dairy value chain in FYR Macedonia, a 
literature on industrial organization and competitiveness is presented, with 
major accent on the competitiveness features in transition countries. Than the 
institutional constraints of the dairy value chain in FYR Macedonia, are 
presented through two institutional analysing approaches: 1) The contracting 
patterns as formal institutional form of governance structure, or the 
restructuring of the vertical relations between dairy farmers and dairy 
processors, and 2) Social network analysis for the informal social structures 
that influence economic outcomes, mainly on horizontal level (informal 
networks of dairy farmers). The institutional setting is presented following the 
agency theory, and its implications in transition economies. 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) is the main economic perspective on 
which the analyses of thesis are based on. It is the major theory which analyses 
the creation of institutions and institutional change, the economic activities and 
the organization of institutional structures which govern those (Hanisch et al., 
2007). NIE also introduces behavioural aspects in the economic analysis, 
identifying the importance of human behaviour in the economic activities and 
decisions. Most of the work in this thesis is positioned in the second and third 
level of Williamson’s (2000) classification of social analysis. Certain specifics 
of the “Embeddedness” level are also included, since it is important to 
understand individual or group attitudes, and how they are shaped by their 
environment, and them their self, shape the economic environment.  
1. Embeddedness (informal institutions, customs, traditions, norms and 
religion); 
2. Institutional environment (formal rules of the game, especially property – 
polity, judiciary, bureaucracy); 
3. Governance (play of the game, especially contracts, or aligning governance 
structures with transactions); 
4. Resource allocation and employment (prices and quantities; incentive 
alignment). 
The institutional environment, which is positioned on the second level of this 
model of social analysis, is central when portraying the economic instability 
that occurred because of the problems with unregulated institutional and legal 
framework in transition countries. Therefore, a practical example of how 
institutional deficiencies can be misused for extracting individual benefits is 
presented through the bankruptcy case of the “Swedmilk” dairy. The reasons 
17 
behind this dairy’s failure are presented, using the Principal-Agent theory 
which considers the relations between the principal (often the owner of the 
business) and the agent (a manager or other person, firm etc., employed by the 
principal); and the agency costs which appear due to information asymmetries 
and possible opportunistic behaviour of the agent (Agency theory). On 
governance level (level 3), the problems with market failure in transition are 
investigated. “The transitional economy suffers from poor market development and 
little organizational experience” (Hanisch et al., 2007 p.3). Therefore, the 
governance structures (contracting) between the dairy farmer-dairy processor 
are investigated, applying Transaction Cost theory, and the transaction cost 
determinants which influence the choice of establishing a contract, or not. 
Furthermore, in environments of institutional problems, describing governance 
structures on informal level is also important. Networks are often considered as 
a form of hybrid governance structures, based on relations and “spontaneous 
mechanism” to govern transactions (Williamson, 2005, p.16). They can also 
serve as a reflection on the level of development and role of informal 
institutions, norms and other types of societal embaddedness on the economic 
development of the society (level one in Williamson’s model of social 
analysis).  
2.1 Competitiveness of agricultural industries in Western Balkan 
countries 
Agriculture is a sector which in the Western Balkans has comparative 
advantages primarily because of the favourable natural resources and climate, 
as well as the availability of cheap labour force and closeness to the EU 
(Lampiette et al., 2009). However, the consolidation and modernization in the 
sector does not follow the patterns of restructuring of the agricultural sectors in 
Southern Europe (ibid). Therefore, in order to meet the changing consumer 
preferences, as well as the requirements of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI’s) 
in the processing and retailing of agricultural products, the agriculture based 
industries are urgently necessitated to restructure their value chains and 
consolidate their production processes on every level (Dries et al., 2009). The 
inefficiencies in the upstream part of the dairy value chain influence the 
competitiveness in the downstream parts of the chain. Furthermore, the 
previous socialist systems in many of the South Eastern European countries 
favoured investments in the industrial sector, resulting in large capacities with 
partial utilization, significantly increasing the costs of production and in this 
way lowering competitiveness (Brodman et al., 2004)  
18 
This was also the case in FYR Macedonia, where the industry was tailored in 
accordance to the ex-Yugoslavian market. Loosing this market with the brake 
up of the Yugoslavian federation posed additional pressure to the intensive 
transitional reforms and restructurings. 
The rate and level of restructuring of agri-food is country- or product-
specific, and is mostly introduced by the restructuring and consolidation of the 
downstream segment, the entrance of FDI’s, as well as the changes of attitudes 
of the dairy farmers (Reardon and Huang, 2005). Analysis of the FDI’s role in 
the restructuring of the value chains and improvement of competitiveness 
contributes to the analysis too. In many cases in Central and Eastern Europe, 
FDI entry have significantly transformed the procurement practices and 
increased the efficiency of the chain by introducing centralized distribution and 
eliminating the numerous intermediaries in the chain (Dries et al., 2004). 
The World Economic Forum (WEF, 2012) defines competitiveness as: “The 
set of institutions, policies, and factors that determine the level of productivity of a 
country”. Martin and Stifelmeyer (2001, p.3) define competitiveness on a sector 
or industry level as the “sustained ability to profitability gain or maintain market 
shares”. The "Structure-Conduct-Performance" paradigm treats industry and 
market structure so to describe market structure and concentration, as well as 
the competitive advantage, and the measurements to quantify the 
competitiveness/rivalry on the markets/industry (ECD, 2003). In business 
strategy economics the competitiveness focus includes the factors such as: 
factor endowments, trade and FDI’s influence on competitiveness (ECD, 
2003). As a theoretical approach Industrial Organization is used to identify the 
characteristics of the industries’, the connections among the actors in the value 
chain and the market structure and environment (Porter, 1980). The analysis of 
the value chain competitiveness, stresses that the main source of 
competitiveness is the structure of the value chain and relations among its 
segments (Simatupang and Srirdharan, 2002). The industrial competitiveness 
comes as a result of a complex set of relations between the state, the 
institutional structures and organizational capabilities of the society (Messner, 
1997). Therefore, detailed information is required not only for the natural 
resources (factor endowments), but also specifics for the different levels of the 
value chain (Gorton et al., 2013). A value chain approach to the 
competitiveness studies of agri-food industries is especially pertinent because 
of agricultural production features (seasonal and perishable nature of products), 
which requires tighter vertical coordination in order to establish efficient 
procurement practices. Porter’s Five Forces model as an industry 
competiveness approach includes both the horizontal (supply chain) and the 
19 
vertical, market structure perspective (Porter, 1998). Porter’s determinants of 
the intensity of industry competition are presented in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Key structural features of competitiveness on industry level (adapted from Porter, 
1998).  
As shown in the graphical presentation there are different determinants which 
shape the structure of competition on industry level and ultimately influence 
the competitive position of the industry (Porter, 2004). In the agri-food markets 
the suppliers and their bargaining power influence the profitability and 
competitiveness of the industry. However, suppliers are powerful only when 
the supply base is more concentrated than its industry partner, and when the 
suppliers are small and segmented they have limited access to capital and land 
(Gorton et al., 2013). The entrance of the new subjects in the industry also 
contribute to the competitive scenery, but in many instances there are barriers 
to entry, such as: economies of scale, asset specific investments, access to 
distribution channels, product differentiation, and the substitute products which 
are present on the market (ibid). FDI’s contribution is of importance since new 
entrants in an industry introduce investments in new institutional and 
technological capacities for modernization, as well as provide various types of 
assistance for their supplying partners. They are mostly present in the 
processing and the retail segment of the industries in Central and Eastern 
European Countries and can significantly contribute to the competitive 
environment in the industry, by motivating domestic firms to implement 
improved marketing and contracting practices (Gow and Swinnen, 1998). 
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Supermarkets and foreign retail chains, entering and taking over food retailing 
in these countries significantly impact the procurement practices and 
requirements in the dairy supply chains (Dries et al., 2004). 
Consumers’ loyalty to certain brands that exist on the market is threat to 
new entrants too, especially in industries where certain domestic producers 
have products with tradition and quality which meets consumers’ preferences 
(Porter, 2004). Government policies can act as both barriers to entry, through 
licencing requirements or bureaucracy procedures and as support of the 
competitiveness, especially on farm level, through government 
support/subsidies (Gorton et al., 2013). However, there is little or even 
negative relation between government supports and the technical efficiency 
and competitiveness on the level of the food sector (Skuras et al., 2006). The 
importance of government interventions is also recognized in the classification 
of the determinants that influence competitiveness in agriculture done by 
Gorton et al. (2013) (Table 1). In this classification, the determinants of 
competitiveness are organized as endogenous and exogenous. For the purpose 
of this thesis farm size and characteristics, factor endowments, government 
interventions and investments (in our case FDI) were of larger significance and 
were part of the competitiveness analysis of the dairy value chain in FYR 
Macedonia.    
 
Table 1.  Determinants of Competitiveness in Agriculture  
Endogenous Determinants                   
(controlled by the firms) 
Exogenous Determinants                          
(beyond the firm) 
Size of the business 
Legal status (ownership) 
Factor intensity 
Product specialization vs. diversification 
Production and marketing practices 
Structure of factors of production  
Characteristics of farm (labour) 
Factor endowments (natural resources, capital 
and land) 
Consumer demand 
Government interventions in agriculture (e.g. 
subsidies, policies, regulations) 
Investments in infrastructure  
Firm location 
Source: Gorton et al., 2013 
2.2 Contracting through Transaction Cost Economics lens  
New Institutional Economics centres the competitiveness concept on 
minimizing the transaction costs which occur in the form of information, 
negotiation, coordination and monitoring (Williamson, 1985). The basic 
assumption is that the organizational structure that the decision makers will 
adopt is going to be the one that minimizes total cost (Production Costs plus 
Transaction Costs) (Williamson, 1985, 2000; Menard and Valceschini, 2005). 
21 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) explains how certain governance structures 
emerge and function (Williamson, 1979, 1985). It is an interdisciplinary field 
suitable for combining economics and business with other areas such as 
agricultural economics and business, with the transaction as the elementary 
unit of analysis (Williamson, 1985). 
Performing Transaction Cost analysis requires detailed knowledge of the 
studied industry, as well as developing deeper understanding of the various 
suppliers-buyer relationships at various stages in the value chain. The analyses 
of the economic aspects that characterize the organization of agriculture are 
determined by the basic features of the agricultural commodities. These 
features may influence the organization of the production and distribution 
(Masten, 2000). Agricultural inputs are posed to a great deal of risk in terms of 
yield and price, because of the seasonal and uncertain nature of agricultural 
production which is hard to predict in advance. Accordingly, the organizational 
form in the agro-food chain has to be designed in a way which will enable 
meeting each agricultural firm’s objectives and farming constraints (Allen and 
Lueck, 2002; Menard and Klein, 2004). Exchange in agriculture is uncertain 
and complex primarily because of the nature of production and products 
specificities. These specificities require alternative organizational forms which 
would lower both production and transacting costs (Young and Hobbs, 2002). 
Governance structures can occur in different forms, from markets to vertical 
integration, with different hybrid forms between those two extremes (vertical 
coordination governed by contracts, network governance structures, or 
cooperatives) (Tadelis and Williamson, 2012). As a hybrid form of 
governance, the primary goal of contracts is to establish a set of predefined 
formal obligations between the transacting partners and their enforcement 
(Masten, 1999). Furthermore, they are, the mechanism for “risk transfer, 
incentives alignment and transaction cost economizing” (ibid, p.26). The production 
specificities along with the large differences in farmers’ size (especially viable 
in the rural areas), characterizes contracting in agriculture as complex and 
variable (Eggertson, 1990). When the exchange becomes complex, more actors 
and stages are involved and transactions become uncertain, human behaviour 
and trust contribute to the level of transaction costs and contribute to the 
economic progress (Rao, 2003). This also means that the costs for conducting 
and monitoring of the transactions also increase (Powell, 1990). Lower trust 
increases the costs for monitoring of the exchange (Williamson, 1985). In order 
to buffer these complexities and uncertainties in agriculture, contracts are used 
as means for proper allocation of risks and incentives, as well as avoiding hold-
up problems, and reducing bargaining costs for the transaction (Joskow, 2003).  
22 
Contracting in agriculture may take different forms. When their form is 
considered, agricultural contracts can be classified as formal and informal 
agreements which can occur in either verbal or written form. They can also be 
classified in accordance to the period of their duration as short-term (seasonal) 
or long-term contracts. In accordance to their structure and the level of 
specification of the transacting conditions, they can also be characterized as 
vaguely or specifically defined agricultural contracts (Will, 2013). Regardless, 
of their form, duration and structure, contracts are acknowledged as inevitably 
incomplete and costly to enforce. They are incomplete in the sense that it is 
impossible to foresee all the outcomes of the transaction in advance, and costly 
to enforce since in many instances third-party involvement is needed in order 
to determine if the obligations in the transactions were meet. Even when 
contracts are detailed and clearly specified, the unanticipated future 
uncertainties leave room for opportunistic behaviour (Williamson, 1985; 
Masten 2000). Such opportunism is more pronounced in underdeveloped 
institutional settings and countries with high costs of contract enforcement. 
Such is the case of post-socialistic economies, where the legal framework is 
either underdeveloped or inoperative (North, 1990). Or as Wagner (2004) 
states, the reconstruction of the transitional societies would require not only 
economic reforms, but also reforms of the legal and political systems.  
In developed market economies, contracts provide valuable safeguard to the 
transacting parties, and in transaction costs terms, the most influential threat 
that necessitates safeguarding is created by asset specific investments and 
uncertainty (North, 1990; Williamson, 1996). Along with the complexity of 
agricultural products, the uncertainty and the possibilities of information 
asymmetries, asset specificity has been traditionally the main focus of 
transaction cost economics. It refers to the alternative uses of an asset, which 
would not have the same productive value if applied for different purposes 
(Williamson, 1985). As the degree of investments in transaction specific asset 
increases, so does the need for complex, long-term contracting or even vertical 
integration for guarding of the transaction (Barry et al., 1992). Other 
Transaction Cost dimensions which contribute to the choice of governance 
structure are the frequency of the transaction and the uncertainty under which it 
will take place. More frequent (repeated) transactions motivate the continuity 
in the seller-buyer relations, lowering the costs of the transaction. Therefore, 
frequent transactions are easier to observe and monitor, they also provide the 
partners with valuable information about the other party lowering the costs of 
contracting through the spot market. Accordingly, infrequent transactions give 
chances for opportunistic behaviour and taking advantage of the informational 
asymmetries that might be present. Thus transactions of this kind are better 
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managed when they are conducted in tighter forms of governance structures 
(Williamson, 1985; Menard, 1996).  
Uncertainty is an exogenous variable of TCE pointing to the possible 
unforeseen variations of the conditions that the transaction will take place in. It 
can also occur as a result of certain behavioural properties of the transaction 
(Williamson, 1985). The level of uncertainty also rises when asset specific 
investments increase (Williamson, 1979 and 1985). Accordingly, in order to 
safe-guard the asset specific investment and lower uncertainty, stronger 
coordination or closer integration will be favoured (Menard, 1996). As the 
most important determinant of transaction costs, asset specificity can be of 
various types: site specificity, physical asset specificity, human asset, dedicated 
assets, brand name capital and temporary specificity. Transaction costs are also 
identified as information, negotiation and monitoring costs. Information costs 
are unavoidable and concern information about buyers, sellers, prices, products 
and are the first issue faced by every firm or individual participant in a 
transaction. Negotiating costs are associated mostly with the act of writing the 
contract itself, and specifying/negotiating the specific terms under which the 
contract will be executed. The costs of monitoring or contract enforcement 
include monitoring human behaviour in the transactions, or supplier/buyer 
interactions in meeting the terms of agreement, product quality measurement, 
law enforcement of contracts malfunctions and breach, etc. (Hobbs,1996).  
The applied research in transaction cost economics can be based on 
different methodological approaches, such as case studies, historical qualitative 
and quantitative econometric models (Machner and Ricman, 2008). Many of 
these empirical studies provide evidence on the relation between transaction 
specifics and the contracting arrangements. The empirical assessment of 
contracting a specific industry, provide inside on the various contracting 
patterns in that industry (Machner and Ricman, 2008). The most recognized 
empirical studies which relate transaction costs or more specific asset 
specificity with the length of contracts are done by Joskow in the coal industry 
(1987). Masten and Crocker (1985) identify the same relation between the 
length of contracts and product specifics. Lyons (1994) related the asset 
specific investments in engineering and the decision to contract or not in the 
first place. However, “there has been little systematic statistical analysis of 
agriculture or the organization of agriculture transactions from a transaction cost 
perspective” (Machner and Ricman, 2008, p.36). More recent studies are dealing 
with the formation of institutions in the agri-food industry in regards to the 
quality signals send to the consumers (Hobbs, 2003). The relation among the 
producers and the processors is described in the case of the hog and pork 
industry in Quebec by Larue et al.’s (2004). In all these studies, the applied 
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research in TCE contributes not only for the understanding of the governance 
structures in agriculture, but also contributes to the development of the TCE 
theory itself (Machner and Ricman, 2008). 
2.3 Social capital and social networks 
In most cases, networks arise as informal mechanisms of coordination, based 
on individual interaction, and restricted to limited groups with related interests 
(Thompson, 2003). Similar to other governance structures, networks also 
contain behavioural aspects in the form of trust, and loyalty which is critical 
for social capital (Rao, 2003). Putnam (1993) integrates trust, norms of 
behaviour and reciprocity of the ties between individuals as measure of social 
capital. Trust reduces transaction costs and is a contributor to economic 
progress (Rao, 2003). Absence of trust could induce significant costs, as joint 
and coordinated activities reduce costs for information search, contracting and 
contract enforcement. Trust also decreases costs for monitoring of the 
exchange (Williamson, 1985; Paldam and Svendsen, 1999).  
An exact definition for social capital does not exist, since its definition 
depends on the field it has been applied in. What is universal for all social 
capital definition is that it provides actors of certain networks with resources, 
which can be accessed only through these social relations (Kadushin, 2012). 
The social capital side of networks is described by Coleman (1988, p.17) as the 
“total amount of benefits that a person can draw (without collateral or high interest 
rates), on his network, if necessary”, or in network terms it is the “network person 
has built (network density)”. It is social capital that positively influences the 
transfer and quality of information by reward and punishment mechanisms 
(Arrow, 1999). It also contributes to social welfare through the general trust on 
a society level (Rothstein and Stole, 2002). Accordingly, one segment of social 
capital focuses on the “formal” forms of social capital, or more specifically the 
part of social capital which is institutionalized and accessible by everyone in 
the society (Putnam, 1993). Another part of social capital is considering the 
social capital held by individuals, which is especially significant for countries 
with inefficient institutions and institutionalized cooperation, although not 
necessarily in positive connotation (Coleman and Bordieu, 1993; Raiser et al., 
2002). A common agreement of both views is that regardless of the level, 
social capital is expected to assists economic development.  
Granoveter (2005) views informal relations or the non-economic actions as 
an important shaper of social life and economic activities. This is what he calls 
“social embeddedness”, or the way economic actions connect and rely on 
informal (non-economic) institutional formations. Embeddedness is important, 
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as it provides: “economies of time, integrative agreements, Pareto improvements in 
allocative efficiency, and complex adaptation” (Uzzi, 1997, p.35). It affects the way 
the actors in the network are connected to the network and how the features of 
the network are influenced by the actors that constitute it (Granovetter 1973, 
1985; Uzzi, 1997). Uzzi (1996) outlines the structural embeddedness approach, 
as an approach which stresses the structure and quality of ties importance in 
generating access to exclusive opportunities and resources. By identifying 
certain patterns of grouping, it can be identified how emmbeddedness 
contributes to the efficient transfer of information, and joint problem solving 
arrangements (Uzzi, 1996, 1997). 
The levels and patterns of social capital are predetermined and rooted in the 
historical background of each society (Putnam, 1993). The importance of 
social capital in all the levels and forms it may take is seen in the social capital 
patterns of post-transition countries (Raiser et al., 2002; Murray, 2006; 
Lissowska, 2013). It was the political background which had significant 
influence on the type of relations and views of society. It has been therefore 
argued that the general level of social capital in those countries is low, because 
of the State influence in the social organizations. In this respect there has been 
an accumulated distrust in public institutions, and the perception that individual 
social capital does not produce benefit on macro, societal level (Lissowska, 
2013). At the same time, and especially in the case of the rural areas, extended 
trust in informal networks (kinship, friendship) remained undamaged even 
during the period of centrally-planned economy (Muray, 2006). However, 
evidence shows that these types of relations contribute to economic growth less 
than properly developed trust in formally institutionalized cooperation and 
involvement in civic organizations – which is the case for the fully evolved 
market economies (Raiser et al., 2002). The connections among actors in rural 
areas are expected to reveal the cognitive side of informal networks in terms of 
trust, norms of behaviour; concepts which are relatively abstract and difficult 
to measure. It is also necessary to have knowledge of the general structure that 
influences collective actions and decision making (Groetaer and Van Bastelaer, 
2001; OECD, 2001).  
Social Network Analyses (SNA) is rooted in the fields of sociology and 
psychology. As an interdisciplinary field it is used to define social concepts 
and behavioural patterns in the social world in various fields of science 
(Coleman, 1988, 1966; Granovetter 1973; Borgatti and Xun, 2009). The 
connection between social capital and networks has been long recognized in 
the literature (Bourdieu, 1983; Coleman, 1988; Burt, 1992; Putnam 1995, 
2000; Lin, 2005). From a social capital perspective, networks are considered to 
be the observable (definable) part of social capital, and the means for access to 
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the embedded resources in the network. (Lin, 2001, 2005). The quantity and 
quality of the embedded resources is closely related to the   structure of the 
network. Therefore understanding the patterns of network formation reveals 
valuable information about the sources and levels of social capital (Lin, 2005). 
Social network analyses have been useful in studying economic performance 
(Uzzi, 1996; Powel, 2003). These analyses include description of the way 
social structures are formed, description of their assets as well as the trigger 
which activates their creation. The focus is often put on different aspects, one 
of them being the informal relationships which influence economic outcomes. 
Wasserman and Faust, (2009) classify relations based on the type and 
incentives for cooperation as:  close relations (kinship, friendship, preference), 
relations based on material resources incentives (lending/borrowing, 
buying/selling), and transactions which include non-material resources and 
informational flow (communication, sending/receiving information). In 
methodological terms, networks are defined as bounded (finite) sets of actors 
(nodes or people, firms, countries), connected by diverse types of relations 
(kinship, friendship, exchange, cooperation, competition) (Hanneman and 
Riddle, 2005; Waserman and Faust, 2009). Societies are built on these groups 
with structural differences (religious and ethnic groups, gender, education), 
accordingly their influence on the economic wellbeing and progress will differ 
(Crudel, 2005).  
2.4 Agency theory 
Inadequate or weak institutional structures involve different types of costs for 
the parties involved by an economic relation. When the economic relations are 
established between the seller and a buyer, between an employer and the 
employees, or between different investors in the same project the analysis of 
these relations are based on the principal-agency theory, which is one part of 
the theory called the agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency theory is a 
branch of NIE focusing on the principal-agent relations, in whom the 
principals’ role is to assigning tasks, and the role of agents is to execute these 
tasks. Another branch of this theory is the positivist branch which is based on 
the assumption of the existence of diverging interests in the principal-agent 
relations (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Fama and Jensen, 1983). Regardless of 
the focus, the theory is appropriate when there are conditions for opportunism 
by the agents, and there are uncertainties of the transacting outcomes 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).   
In many attributes, agency theory shows similarities with TC theory, but 
with different focus and several distinctive independent variables (Table 1). 
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Both theories contain the assumption of human behaviour (bounded rationality 
and opportunism or self-interest seeking with guile) as being crucial for the 
possible deceitful behaviour from one or more actors in a relation. They also 
emphasize the need of contract governance in order to mitigate the 
information-asymmetry problems that are the core of the principal-agent 
relations. The relations between principals and agents are often governed by 
contracts. However, in the previous section we discussed that the institutional 
uncertainties, accompanied by the human aspects of the actors, makes 
foreseeing all possible outcomes of the transaction impossible, thus a complete 
contract does not exist in the reality. In turn, this contract incompleteness 
creates opportunities for agents to act in their best interest instead (Eisenhard, 
1989). As in the case of transaction costs, the monitoring costs against 
opportunistic behaviour are the central part of the principal means to control 
and monitor agents (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen and Meckling, 1979). 
Table 2. Agency theory and its similarities and differences with Transaction cost analyses  
.  Similarities Differences 
T
C
E
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en
cy
 T
h
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ry
 Benaviour assumptions: 
bounded rationality 
opportunism 
 
Hierarchies =  
Behaviour based contracting 
Markets =  
Outcome based contracts 
Transaction Cost Economics:   
1) organizational boundaries 
2) focus on asset spec. and small  number bargaining 
Agency Theory:   
 1) relations between contracting parties(agents and 
principals); 
 2) Focus on information asymmetries and risk 
attitudes. 
Source: Eisenharrt, 1989 
 
The literature classifies agency costs which emerge as a result of agents’ 
opportunistic behavior as (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen and Meckling, 
1979; Barney and Ouchi, 1986): i) Monitoring expenditures on the part of the 
principal refer to the costs related to regulating and monitoring the agent’s 
behavior. In general this would involve a contract that defines the rights and 
obligations of the agent and would also ensure contract enforcement. 
Furthermore there are mechanisms which could stimulate agents to behave in 
principal’s best interest in terms of bonuses, profit sharing etc. However, all of 
these mechanisms involve additional cost for the principal (Fama, 1980; Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1996). Ii) Bonding expenditures on the 
part of the agent – investments on the agent’s behalf in order to obtain 
confidence and trust from principal’s side. If the principal has trust in the 
agent, the latter may succeed in being deceitful and hence the agent may spend 
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large efforts in obtaining such trust. Residual loss considers the welfare losses 
for the principal. Here the risk that the agent is able to redirect some of the 
profits (surpluses) from his principal to himself is considered. Since the agent 
has the right to make independent decisions, there is a risk that he will not 
manage the organization in such a fashion that benefits the principal the best. 
In cases when there are possibilities for opportunism such as in the case of 
uncertain and weakly regulated institutional and legal settings, the agents 
would be able to redirect some of the rents to themselves.  
As noted, human behavior is in the essence of the agency problems which 
may be reduced if trust again is present between the contracting partners, or if 
the partners have social capital invested in one another (Svendsen and 
Svendsen, 2009). The behavioural assumption originates from the organization 
theory literature, and occurs in TCE and in Agency Theory. It characterizes 
human nature through bounded rationality (limitation on the cognitive 
competence) and opportunism (self-interest) (Williamson, 1985). Bounded 
rationality means that risk of opportunism is often present and humans will 
tend to use the advantage of turning situations in their best interest so to extract 
benefits from it. It also presumes that not all humans (agents) articulate the 
same level of opportunism (Williamson 1989). Bounded rationality also 
indicates that even when human beings tend to act rationally and make rational 
decisions, their capacity limits them so they do not account all feasible decision 
alternatives (Hobbs, 1996). It is an important feature for the economic 
organization and combined with uncertainty and complexity disables agents to 
make completely rational decisions. In such instances trust is expected to act as 
a safe-guarding mechanism that reduces uncertainties and lowers the need for 
costly mechanisms to monitor relations. However, reliance on trust is justified 
only in cases of more developed markets where communication and 
transactions among partners is more frequent (Rao, 2003).  
The developing and growing markets present potential for FDI, primarily 
because of cheap labour and resources. The domestic economies on the other 
hand benefit from these investments in terms of knowledge and technology 
transfer. However, implementing western business practices is often difficult in 
countries with underdeveloped institutional structure, such as the Western 
Balkan post-socialist countries (Ahrens, 2006). The problems of these societies 
are deeply rooted the political environment which is supposed to provide 
effective enforcement of economic bonds and agreements (North, 1986). Trust 
is therefore related to the institutional structure in society, and in countries with 
the weak legal framework, not even the judicial system may be trusted to 
protect its citizens in their varying roles - as labourers, suppliers, consumers, 
investors (Granovetter, 2005, p.361).  
29 
3 Methodology 
Institutional malfunctioning is often related with difficulties to obtain official 
statistical data and information in countries facing transitional problems 
(Hanisch et al., 2007). However, data about institutional development is 
difficult to obtain even in the Western countries (ibid). Therefore, in order to 
construct a more detailed presentation of the dairy industry in FYR Macedonia, 
as well as deal with the data quality and unavailability, both data and 
methodological triangulation was applied in this thesis. Data triangulation 
offers combination of different types of data from various sources, and 
methodological triangulation combines qualitative and quantitative approaches. 
Triangulation is a convenient way to increase the validity of the research and 
its results, which is especially valuable for the general conclusions of this 
thesis. On the other hand, the fact that each of the papers in this thesis uses 
separate method of data collection and methodological approach, it lowers the 
possibility for contradiction that can occur when data and methodological 
approaches are mixed (Robson, 2002). 
Different data such as: data from two different surveys on national and 
regional level, official national statistical data, interviews as qualitative 
information, and different types of reports on the dairy industry and the 
country, media information were used in this thesis. The thesis connects three 
institutional theoretical approaches and an industrial organization theory for 
answering the general aim. Accordingly, matching methodological tools are 
employed also and they are summarized in Table 3. 
  
30 
Table 3. Basic characteristics of the methodological approaches 
Stage Level of analysis 
Number 
of units 
Data  Analyses 
I Value chain analysis - 
Desk research: various 
sources, Euromonitor 
data base  
Competitiveness and  
market concentration 
measures 
II 
Vertical  
(Dairy farmer – dairy 
processor relations) 
213 Face-to-face survey 
Empirical model 
(probit): Transaction 
Costs determinants that 
influence contracting 
patterns   
III 
 Horizontal  
 (Dairy farmers’ 
relations) 
153 
Face-to-face survey Social Networks 
(network structures) 
IV “Swedmilk” dairy 1 Various sources Case study 
Secondary data: State Statistical Office, National reports on the sector, Data bases and related 
documents, Media reports. 
 
Two separate surveys were conducted for the purposes of paper II and III. Both 
surveys were conducted through Face-to-face interviews, as one of the most 
costly and time consuming administration mode, however the only applicable 
data collection method in the case of this particular surveys. The first reason 
behind such decision is the nature of the surveys and the second is the data 
availability. The correspondents or interviewees in both surveys are farmers, 
generally living in rural areas without access to modern technology, sometimes 
not even a telephone-ruling out the options of telephone or webmail survey. 
Additionally, the time to communicate the questionnaire was more than 30 
minutes, thus the telephone interviewing was considered as generally not 
applicable, and the mail-survey alternative was rejected due to the expectation 
for a very low response rate. Face-to-face was thought to be the most 
appropriate mode that provides personal contact, more detailed explanations 
and possibilities for obtaining data of better quality (Biemer and Lyberg, 
2003).  
3.1 Competitiveness analysis 
In the descriptive part of the competitiveness analyses, or as a qualitative 
analytical tool, we combine Porter’s determinants of National advantage with 
more detailed explanation on the forces which drive competition on industrial 
level (value chain analysis). Additionally FDI’s contribution to the competitive 
environment as well as measures of competitiveness, or the market 
concentration indexes and development were also applied in order to quantify 
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competitiveness (Porter, 1990; Frohberg and Hartmann, 1997). In this way, 
two levels of competitiveness analysis were integrated: First is competitiveness 
as the ability to increase market shares and the second is competitiveness as the 
most effective way of employing resources (competition in factor markets) 
(Frohberg and Hartmann, 1997). For this purpose data from various sources 
were combined: journals, reports on the industry and the country development, 
national strategies, State statistical data, and other related documents on the 
competitiveness on national level (e.g. World Economic Forum-Global 
Competitiveness Index, Global Retailer Development Index). In order to 
illustrate the competitiveness levels of the market for milk and dairy products, 
one part of the competitiveness analyses measures market concentration, or 
measures which illustrate if the market is competitive or concentrated. This 
thesis includes the following concentration measures: Concentration Ratio 
(CR3), the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) and the Lorenz curve. The data 
for the market concentration measures are obtained from the Euromonitor data 
base (2012), which provides detailed data on the retail sales of the companies 
present on FYR Macedonia’s dairy market. It should be noted that all these 
concentration measures carry within themselves the basic risk of overlooking 
important subjects (firms), since the choice and number of subjects in the 
calculation are based on each person’s subjective reasoning. 
Concentration ratios (CR3) represent the shares of retail sales for the three 
(sometimes five, seven etc.) of the most dominant competitors in the total 
sales: 
 
CR3=S1+S2+S3 
 
Concentration ratios take values from 0 to 1, with values closer to 0 indicating 
extremely competitive industry. Values less than 0.5 indicate very competitive 
industry (from perfect competition to oligopoly). Values from 0.5 to 0.8 direct 
to oligopoly and closer to 1 suggest higher concentration of the market or 
monopoly (Gould, 2010). The main deficiency of this measure is the fact that it 
does not include all the firms in the market, or the distribution of firm size 
(USDJ, 2010).   
HHI is another market concentration measure which is calculated as the 
sum of squared shares (in %) of each of the largest companies on the market 
(USDJ, 2010): 
 
    ∑         
 
Where, si represents the market shares of certain brand (in this case) and n is 
the number of firms. The different values of this index reveal the differences in 
market concentration. The index values of 100 express highly competitive 
(2) 
(1) 
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markets (perfect competition), between 100-1,500 un-concentrated market, 
moderate market concentration 1,501-2,500, and over 2,500 high market 
concentration. HHI is a more accurate measure than CR3, since it provides a 
more comprehensive representation of the changes in market shares among the 
larger companies on the market (Gould, 2010). HHI, provides a valuable 
overview of the competitiveness levels changes the over time (if markets are 
becoming less or more competitive), and important information for 
understanding which of the dominant market competitors are gaining or losing 
in a certain time frame. These features make HHI more complex and detailed 
measure than the CR3 measure (Gould, 2010).     
Lorenz curve is included as a visual presentation of the income distribution 
(Lorenz, 1905), or the share of the total income that is allocated to certain 
percentage of the considered population (individuals, firms). The Lorenz curve 
is accompanied by the Gini index which is presented as an integral that shows 
the difference or departure from the line of perfect equality (Farris, 2010 
p.852).   
    ∫ [      ]   
 
 
 
The Gini index takes values from 0 to 1, where 0 is perfect equitability (all the 
dairy brands have equal share of the market); and 1 where single dairy brand 
holds all the market power (Faris, 2010). For our case, the calculation 
considers the ten largest dairy brands which are present on the market for milk 
and dairy products in the country. It takes values from 0 to 1, where 0 is perfect 
equitability (all the dairy brands have equal share of the market); and 1 where 
single dairy brand holds all the market power (Faris, 2010).   
3.2 Contract choice 
Transaction Cost analyses requires detailed knowledge and information on the 
organizational forms, product attributes, assets, and the environment in which 
the transaction takes place. However, direct measurement of dimensions such 
as specificity and uncertainty is difficult, and thus data in a suitable format is 
also difficult to find (Masten, 2000). Transaction costs are not easily measured, 
cannot be separated from the other costs, and there is no routine for collection 
of these kinds of data (Hobs, 1997). This data limitation, or lack of measurable 
variables and direct observation, makes it difficult to quantify these costs in 
financial terms.  
In order to identify the contracting patterns among the dairy farmers and 
their processing partners, this part of the thesis is based on data provided by 
213 farmers located in five milk producing regions of FYR Macedonia: 
Pelagonia (Bitola region-71; Prilep region-59); Gostivar and Tetovo region-36; 
(3) 
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Skopje region-22; Krusevo region-20. A face-to-face survey was carried-out in 
the selected region in the period from August to December 2011. The sampling 
design choice was partly influenced by the survey administration mode (face-
to-face interviews), and data availability. This usually indicates clustered 
samples, or non-random, multistage-clustered sample design (Biemer and 
Lyberg, 2003). Since data on farm level in countries in transition is either non-
existent or of poor quality, the choice of dairy farmers both suitable and 
available for this survey was non-random, and in consultation with members of 
local agricultural extension services, which are in contact with the dairy 
farmers on regular basis. The multistage clustered sampling is also appropriate 
in cases such as this, when a complete list of all members of the population 
does not exist or is incomplete. In clustered sampling, the sampling units 
should be collected in groups, and should represent heterogeneity of the 
sample. It is suitable for this survey since the intentions were to include both 
big and small farms within different districts or parts of the country in order to 
capture a representative picture of the situation in the dairy sector. 
The survey was based on a specialized questionnaire compiled for this 
purpose. The questionnaire contains 90 questions grouped in four general 
groups: general questions, transaction specific questions, questions on the 
cooperation specifics, and open questions (Table 4). Open-ended questions are 
used mostly in order initiating more informal interest in on-farm problems. 
These questions can be also a source of valuable information and ideas for 
further development of the research. 
Table 4. Transaction cost specifics survey–questionnaire outline  
Basic farms’ data Name, contact, location  
Household characteristics Age,  gender, education 
Farming income Dairy farming, land, labor, fodder and other inputs 
Herd size and output Number, breed, produced and sold milk quantities, choice of 
dairy  
Agreements Contract types and duration, average price and ways of its 
determination, type of payment 
Delivery and payment terms 
(TC structure) 
Payment delays, time devoted to negotiation, site specifics, costs 
for searching for buyer, reasons for switching partners, milk 
quality measurements, milk collection etc.  
Future investments plans Farm capacity, flock increasing, credit terms etc. 
Cooperation Importance of cooperation, benefits, information sources, 
membership in cooperative 
Open-ended optional question Farmers’ opinion, ideas, problems  (e. g. Swedmilk) 
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The questionnaire was pre-tested with certain number of farmers and a 
manager of the procurement practices in the largest processing factory in the 
country. This procedure was undertaken in order to identify the design flaws, 
correct for the identified problems and in this way avoid errors of greater 
magnitudes in the main study (Biemer, Lyberg, 2003). The final survey was 
conducted in the period from August to December 2011. The data was 
analysed by an empirical model which includes the transaction costs 
dimensions as dependant variables C  (asset specificity, uncertainty and 
frequency), as well as trust which represents the safe-guarding mechanisms 
that reduces uncertainties and transaction costs: 
 
πi=βXi+ei                                   (4)  
 
where, i is the probability of the dairy producer i having a formal contract 
with a dairy to deliver and supply milk, Xi is a vector (set) of explanatory 
variables whose data are provided by the surveyed farmers, β is the vector of 
coefficients and ei  is the error term with a cumulative density function F (e). 
To generate a heteroskedasticity-consistent variance–covariance matrix, the 
standard errors of the coefficients were derived using the Eicker–White 
procedure (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993, p. 552-556).  
Dairy farmers were asked a binary choice question, or whether they have a 
contract (assigned 1), or they do not have a formal contract with their dairy 
processing partner (assigned 0). The empirical model was estimated through a 
probit estimation procedure using maximum likelihood. The model assumes 
three base conditions: Bitola region (the milk producing region with highest 
milk production, and number of dairy cows in the country), the Holstein-
Friesian breed (as a specific investment and breed with highest milk yields) 
and farmers which do not have frequent meetings with dairy representatives. 
3.3 Social network data collection and analyses 
Social network analysis is applied in this thesis as the methodological approach 
to present the informal networking patterns between dairy farmers. As a 
methodological tool it analyses the patterns of social structures or the “specific 
set of actors and the ties among them” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994 p.9). Since the 
focus of this type of analyses is on relations rather than transactions, gathering 
relational data is linked to specific collection and analysing techniques, as well 
as software tools for analysis (Scott, 2000). Therefore, in order to capture the 
specific data requirements, a separate survey was conducted. The survey was 
performed in a “bounded area” of eight villages (Table 6) selected from the 
most important milk producing region in the country (Pelagonia). All the 
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villages are within a close distance and are also close to the city of Bitola, 
where most of the important processors in the country are located or have some 
presence. The choice of the area was done so as to capture villages with mixed 
socio-economic and national structure, as well as diversity of farms by size and 
degree of modernization. There are 193 family dairy farming households in the 
selected area, producing milk for commercial purposes. Each of those dairy 
farmers was contacted, and 154 dairy farmers were available for the interview.  
Table 5 Graphical presentation of the villages’ dispersion in the sample area and number of 
respondents in each village  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It should be noted that the standard statistical sampling procedures are not 
suitable for SNA, and are only applicable in the case of egocentric networks 
(Marsden, 1990). This makes sampling in SNA a difficult and risky practice, 
since there is a risk of omitting important relations by not including all actors 
in the network. Therefore in most instances, it is the researcher that decides on 
the boundaries of the sample, which would be most suitable for testing of the 
research hypothesis (Wasserman and Faust, 2009). The literature on sampling 
in SNA approves sampling in cases where complete enumeration of actors is 
available and was followed, attaining in this way full information on all the 
existent relations in the network of interest (Scott, 2000).  
When the actors of the network are persons, the questionnaire is an 
appropriate mode for data collection (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The face-
to-face survey was conducted in mid-2012 using a questionnaire, which is one 
of the most commonly used means of data collection in Social Network 
Analysis (Marsden, 1990; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Besides the basic 
characteristic (attributes) of the respondents, the dairy farmers or the family 
representative who reflects on the households’ relations, the most important 
Village Number of dairy farmers’ 
households (responded/listed) 
Greshnica                  18 / 21 
Zhabeni 16 / 20 
Kravari 17 / 20 
Lazhec 34 /43 
Opticari 19 /21 
Poeshevo 23 / 35 
Medzitlija 16 /20 
Kremenica 11 / 13 
Total 154 / 193 
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part of the questionnaire is the “Name generating table”, which in fact ponders 
the relational data. The SNA questionnaire outline is presented in Table 6. 
The “Name generating table” is the most important data collection part of 
SNA questionnaire. It is representing the relations and the structural variables, 
which are the essence of social network data. They provide information on the 
economically based incentives for dairy farmers to cooperate, as well as the 
available social resources of the nominated persons in the “name generating 
table” (quality and quantity) (Lin, 2005; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). In this 
section of the questionnaire there is a combination of “free” and “fixed choice” 
design of relational questions in which each dairy farmer was asked to name at 
least five other farmers they have relations with regard to agricultural 
(business) matters. The number of choices was not given as a constraint, since 
a constraint on the nomination process can lead to measurement errors, but as 
motive for receiving more nominations from each respondent (Lin, 2005; 
Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Face-to-face mode was selected primarily 
because of the survey specificity and need to explain the purpose of the 
research. 
Table 6. Social network analyses –questionnaire outline  
I) Basic farms’ data Name, contact, village,  code number 
II) Household 
characteristics 
Age,  gender, education  Socio-economic attributes of dairy 
farmers 
Farming income Dairy farming, land, labor, 
fodder and other inputs 
. Structure of dairy farms 
Herd size and output Number, breed, produced and 
sold milk quantities, choice of 
dairy  
Characteristic of the 
vertical relation with 
dairy processor 
Dairy processing partner, 
Contract types and duration, 
average price and ways of its 
determination, type of payment 
Information on the institutional setting 
which influences the occurrence of 
particular types of relations 
Future investments 
plans 
Farm capacity, flock increasing, 
credit terms etc. 
III) Networks Importance of cooperation, 
benefits, information sources, 
membership in cooperative 
Possible benefits from participation in 
these kinds of institutions 
Participation in the existing institutions 
(farm associations/organizations 
IV) Name 
Generating table 
(ego networks) 
Each of the nominated person’s:  
- relation to you. 
- main reason for cooperation  
- socio-economic and farm 
characteristics (as perceived by 
the respondent) 
Listing farmers from their immediate 
(village) and within the research 
area)  
Main incentives for cooperation  
Main information sources 
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Our previous survey experience revealed farmers’ generally distrustfulness and 
unwillingness to share personal information. Therefore it was necessary to 
explain and encourage them to nominate dairy farmers with whom they discuss 
important agricultural matters. This is a standard question suitable for building 
networks based on the ego-networks of each respondent (Kadushin, 2012). 
Once collected, relational data, need to be organized in adjacency matrices 
(square case-by-case) for the relations among actors only, and case-by-
affiliation in the case of attributes (ethnicity attribute) (Scott, 2000). The level 
of social capital, the types of relations, and the modes through which they were 
analysed is presented in Table 7. 
Table 7. Selected network measures of social capital   
Level of social capital   Selected measures 
Social capital on institutional level 
Trust in government through membership 
in organizations 
Bonding and binding relations  
Type of relation 
 
Adjacency matrix 
154 x 154 dairy farmers  
(1 = relation, 0 = no relation) 
Friendship 
Kinship 
Social capital on 
informal level 
Networks: size, 
density, diversity 
Same village 
 Sale to the same 
dairy 
Social capital on 
generalized level 
Betweeness centrality, 
degree 
Incentives for cooperation 
Adjency matrix 
154 x154 dairy farmers 
(1 = relation, 0 = no relation) 
Information sharing 
Production practices  
Joint transport/cooling of milk 
Joint use of equipment  
 
Networks: size, 
density, diversity 
Ethnicity – attribute (3x154) Ethnic groups of each farmer Network diversity 
 
The Social capital measures are applied on two one-mode (all actors are treated 
as being equal) networks, the first representing the network of dairy farmers 
and their processing partner, and the second representing the networks of dairy 
farmers only. The aim was to see the differences of these networks both 
through visual presentation of the networks and through selected network 
measures. The analysis and visualizations were performed in specialized 
software tools for network analysis-UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002) and 
visualisation-NetDraw (Borgatti, 2002).  
3.4 Case study methodology 
Case study methodology is applied to the Swedmilk dairy case, first because it 
fits the format of the research questions (how and why the bankruptcy 
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occurred), which best explain contemporary or historical events followed over 
time. Second, because it provides in-depth description of cases where “the 
boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2009 
p.18; Stake, 1995). An important feature of case study methodology is data 
triangulation, or the use of various data sources in answering the research 
question. Following Yin’s (2009) propositions for constructing a case study, 
our case study includes multiple source of evidence (data source triangulation) 
in order to capture all aspects of this dairy’s failure. This also provides ground 
for more “convincing and accurate” conclusions (Yin, 2009 p.116) and higher 
construct validity.  
The case of the “Swedmilk” dairy was a noteworthy case for our study from 
the beginning of our research. Being the first green-field investment in the 
sector, our primary aim was to analyse how this dairy will affect the overall 
dairy sector and its modernization. By introducing a typical, good example of 
FDI we aimed to present a successful story which was expected to introduce 
the long needed changes in the dairy sector. The case was additionally 
interesting since it was a Swedish company in FYR Macedonia, and it 
coincides with our project and cooperation between the two countries.  
After the unexpected development, this typical and positive example turned 
into an “extreme (unique) case” and as such even more interesting for the 
research. However, the main risk in these type of situations is the major 
limitation of data availability and accessibility. Because of the specific nature 
of this case, sensitive detailed data was very difficult to obtain, and secondary 
data, data from reports and media were used as the main source of information. 
Published data included sources such as: news releases, Swedfund reports, 
Swedmilk plans and documents, contracts, government data, correspondence 
letters, archival data. Semi-structured interviews with managers of competitor 
dairies and experts (government and research representatives) contributed to 
the data triangulation. Reaching information from the actors directly involved 
in the case was a problem, and even when our interviewees agreed to share 
information, their anonymity was required. 
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4 Results and analysis 
4.1 Paper I: “Competitiveness as a driver of change-the 
restructuring and consolidation of the dairy industry in the 
FYR Macedonia”  
 
The patterns of restructuring and the level of modernization of the dairy 
industry in FYR Macedonia are presented in the first paper of this thesis. The 
aim is to identify the conditions that delayed the development and the 
competitiveness position of the dairy industry on the domestic, the regional and 
the EU markets.  
This overview shows high fragmentation in the upstream segment of the 
dairy value chain in FYR Macedonia. Small-scaled dairy farmers (1-5 cows) 
constituting the major share of the supply base (74% of the total number of 
dairy farmers).  Farmers are un-organized, and there are no dairy cooperatives. 
Farms are un-modernized, meaning that they apply primitive production 
techniques and instruments, such as milking and cooling equipment, old 
facilities for cow breeding, low specialization of milk breeds, etc. There is also 
a slight increase in the yield per cow (2005-2012), which can be due to 
improvements in the breeding structure of dairy cows in the country (MAFWE, 
2012). Still, the yields per cow are much lower than the EU-27 average (6,700 
kg/cow) and the milk yields in most of the Western Balkan countries, which 
are the country’s major trading partner for milk and dairy products.  
The natural resources to practice grazing-based livestock breeding in the 
country are relatively favourable. Over 50% of the agricultural land belongs to 
the pastures category, but expensive fodder still accounts for 50% of the total 
costs of livestock breeding (MAFWE, 2012). This is mainly because of the 
improper use of the pastures as well as the unregulated land management 
affecting the costs of production as well as the quality of raw milk.  
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Government policies   
The government introduced measures for revitalization of farms from 2008. 
Тhose measures mostly include direct payments for: assistance for the fodder 
production, for produced and sold cow milk aimed for industrial processing 
and for head of cattle owned by the farmers. The level of subsidies has 
constantly increased in the case of subsidies per hectare of used land for 
producing fodder (doubled from 2008 to 2012 amounting close to 200 Euro/ha
7
 
in 2012). The subsidy per head of cattle owned was 45 Euro (2012), and for 
cow milk, the support ranged from 6.5 Euro/100 litters in 2008 to 5.7 Euro/100 
litters of produced and sold cow milk for further industrial processing in 2012 
(MAFWE, 2012). 
Milk processing is characterized by high fragmentation. There are 77 
registered milk processing facilities, with different size and production 
capacities (38% under 1,000 litters’ daily capacity) dispersed across the 
country. Many of the dairy processing capacities are faced with problems of 
full capacity utilization, and this is reflected in the decrease of the industrial 
milk production from 14,934 tones 2008, to 10,830 tons in 2012 (SSO, 2007-
2012).  
 
Market structure  
More than half of the raw cow milk, purchased from the dairy farmers in the 
country is processed by three dairy processors: IMB Mlekara Bitola, Zdravje 
Radovo and Ideal Shipka, which are the major domestic dairy processors on 
the market for cow milk and dairy products. Regarding the retail sale of milk 
and dairy products, the market concentration measures which refer to the 
largest domestic processors (CR3) varies from 0.5 in 2003 to 0.4 in 2012 for 
the retail sales of dairy products, and values from 0.6 in 2003 to 0.4 in 2012 for 
the market for milk. These ratios point to the fact that around 40% to 50% of 
the total retail sales of milk and dairy products is done by the three domestic 
dairies. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is calculated for the same period 
(2003-2012), and in general it expresses moderate-to-low levels of 
concentration of the retail market for milk and dairy products.  More 
specifically, its values have a decreasing trend for the retail shares of the 47 
companies which compete in the market for dairy products. The value ranges 
from 1,957 in 2003 to 1,375 in 2012, indication of the gradual de-concentration 
of this segment of the dairy retail. On the market segment for cow milk, the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index is calculated based on the retail sales of 12 dairy 
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companies. These values range from 1,750 in 2003 to 2,009 in 2012 which can 
be considered as an indication of the gradual concentration of this segment of 
the dairy retail. The competitive environment on the dairy market is confirmed 
by the Lorenz curve (e.g. 20% of the retail sales are carried out by 50% of the 
processors, or 63% of the retail sales are carried out by 90% of the processors); 
and the Gini coefficient of inequality which in our population group (ten dairy 
brands with highest sales in EUR - 2012) confirmed that there is relatively 
equal distribution of retail sales (medium value of 0.5).  
 
Retail structure  
Most of the supermarkets in the country began operating in the early 1990’s 
and more than 50% of their stores are located in the capital city, Skopje. 
However, the retail segment in the country is still in its early stages of 
development (Atkearney, 2013). There is moderate saturation of the retailing 
sector (56%), making this sector still appealing for companies mostly from the 
region. The small market capacity as well as the logistics cost and high 
dependence on local distribution does not attract large European retail chains. 
The structure of the supply in the country is still constituted by clasical 
individual stores-around 85% (SSO census, 2008). The sale of milk and dairy 
products in FYR Macedonia is also dominantly carried out by small grocery 
retailers and supermarkets occupying much smaller shares of the retail sales 
and the discounters, hypermarkets and other non-grocery retailers hold minor 
shares (Euromonitor, 2012). 
 
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) 
FYR Macedonia has devoted governmental resources and succeeded to 
improve the macroeconomic and business conditions in order to improve its 
competitive position and attract FDIs. However, the country was ranked 129, 
or in the lower segment of the ranking by the FDI Inward Attraction (among 
181 economies) (WIR
8
 2012, Macedonia), which is a noteworthy drop 
compared to the ranking in 2000, in which the country ranked 88 among 178 
economies.  
FDI’s in agriculture participates with an average share of 0.8% in the total 
foreign investments, (2006-2012), with more of these investments concentrated 
in manufacturing of food products, beverages and tobacco products and 
wholesale and trade (WTO, 2013). There exists a general trend of FDI in the 
processing segment, reflected in the recent consolidation of the value chains in 
the entire Western Balkan Region. There have been series of acquisitions and 
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FDI entrance in the existing and leading dairies in every country from Ex-
Yugoslavia. Two of the leading dairy processing companies in the country 
IMB Mlekara Bitola and Ideal Shipka were acquired by a regional processing 
partner Imlek Serbia and Ducat Croatia, and in this way they became part of 
larger food groups such as the Danube Food Group and Lactalis. The Turkish 
dairy company Sutash is the latest FDI investment in the dairy processing 
segment. It entered the market with the restarting of the only green-field 
investment in the industry; the bankrupt Swedmilk dairy in 2009. It expected 
that these investments will contribute for creating a more competitive 
environment on the market, and in the same time also increase the 
competitiveness of the industry by investments in modernization of the chain 
and transfer of novel knowledge and technology. 
4.2 Paper II: “To contract or not in the food sector of transition 
economies? Evidence from the dairy sector in FYR 
Macedonia” 
In paper II, the vertical contractual patterns between the dairy farmers and their 
processing partners were explored. The empirical model included the 
transaction cost determinants of the probability of formal contracts to exist or 
not. The results reveal several variables which contribute to this decision. On 
the dairy processor side, an important determinant is its size, or larger the 
dairy’s capacity, the larger is the probability that it will be willing to safe-guard 
the asset specific investment and transaction with the dairy farmers by means 
of a formal contract. The same is the case with the milk yields which also 
shows a positive effect on the probability of a farmer having a contract with the 
dairy. A logical explanation would be that in order to deal with the problems of 
underutilization of capacities which is often a problem in cases of segmented 
supply base, dairy processor would be willing to formally oblige with dairy 
farmers that have higher yields. Related variable to this matter is the type of 
breeds that the dairy farmers own. High probability of formal contracting is 
present in the cases of dairy farmers which have specialized milking cows of 
the Holstein-Friesian breed which was one of the reference points of this 
model. Farmers with cross-breeds have even higher probability of contracting a 
written agreement with a dairy than those who have a dairy herd made up of 
Holstein-Friesian breed. Cross-breeds are the prevailing breeds in the country, 
and even though they are kept for dual purposes, the dairies which tend to 
assure constant intake of raw material have an incentive to have formal 
contract with this category of dairy farmers. In terms of site specificity, the 
dairy farmers from the Bitola and Krusevo region have the highest probability 
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of having formal contracts. These are regions in immediate or close proximity 
to two of the three largest dairy processing capacities, situated in Bitola 
(Pelagonia region-the milk producing region in the country).  
Regarding the future investment plans, this variable showed high 
significance in the empirical model, however with the opposite sign, than 
expected. A plausible explanation is that the farmers which do not have 
contract are small-scale farmers with intentions to grow, therefore need 
contracts to support this growth. This can be also related to the fact that the 
dairy farmers which have contracts are satisfied from their relations with the 
dairy farmers and those who have not have therefore the incentives to reach 
this satisfaction from the transaction. It is expected that the on-farm 
investments would also increase milk yields and therefore increase the 
probability of formal contracting. The same applies when asset specific 
investments in cooling and milking equipment are undertaken. In the case of 
cooling equipment which is assigned by the dairy, it is the dairy instead of the 
dairy farmers which would want to safe-guard this investment and in this 
respect establish a contract. Accordingly the dummy variables which 
concerned the farmer who has simultaneously cooling and milking equipment 
and farmers who received cooling equipment from the dairy, have positive 
impact on the independent variable. However, this is only the case when the 
future investments are included in the model. The survey shows that along with 
on-farm mechanization investments, herd enlargement is the most common 
type of investment that farmers plan for the future (35% of the answers). The 
level of satisfaction of dairy farmers is also statistically significant with the 
expected, positive sign. The more satisfied farmers are with the dairy they 
cooperate with, the higher is the possibility that they will want to continue with 
the same transacting partner and renew their formal contracts with the dairy. 
An unexpected negative result was obtained in the case of farm ownership, 
captured by the number of years that the farmer has owned his farm. This can 
be justified with the fact that owning a farm reduces uncertainties in terms of 
investments, opposite to a dairy farmers that own a farm for a shorter period of 
time. Therefore, in order to initiate progress in the dairy value chain, establish 
a firm institutional setting is an imperative. In this respect tighter coordination, 
ought to be reached with long-term formal contracts, which will eliminate the 
present uncertainties and risks, and in this way stimulate investments in farm 
enlargement, specialized breeds, mechanization and equipment. 
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4.3 Paper III: How is social capital structuring social networks in 
post-communist countries?  
In paper III, this thesis includes analysis of the social capital levels and its 
patterns of development in the agricultural settings of post-socialist countries. 
In order to do this, social network analysis (SNA), on micro (dairy farm) level 
was applied. The results from the general part of the study showed that dairy 
farmers in our surveyed region still express distrust and resilience towards the 
institutionalized forms of cooperation such as farm associations or 
cooperatives, and do not understand how this cooperation could be used for 
joint and individual benefits. Farmer’s motives for cooperation are mostly for 
joint use of agricultural mechanization and equipment, and in much smaller 
rate for information. The explanatory results show that dairy processors are the 
main source of information for 69% of the dairy farmers. The social network 
measures also confirm the importance of the dairy processors in the network of 
dairy farmers. When the dairy processors are included in the network, the 
overall networks show better connectedness through their processing partners 
when compared to the networks in which dairy processors are not included. 
However, the overall density is very small which indicates to the low level of 
connections among dairy farmers. The largest dairies, which are also the 
largest dairies in the country, have the highest degree of connections, and 
betweenness centrality, meaning that actors (dairy farmers) are mostly 
connected through these dairies, which lay on the path on most of the ties 
between the farmers.  
In order to see how the dairy farmers connect on horizontal level (excluding 
the dairy processors), the research disaggregate the informal networks, and 
analyses the information exchange network of dairy farmers relations. The 
structure of this network revealed close to a complete fragmentation of the 
dairy farmers’ network. The fragmentation of the network is affecting its 
density, which is very small, and accordingly the geodesic distances are also 
small. The average distance (among reachable pairs) implies that although all 
actors are not "reachable" from all others, the distance between them is not that 
large, which implies to the possibility of faster transfer of information across 
this network. As an indicator of embeddedness, the low level of reciprocity 
which suggested that only 23% of the ties in the information exchange network 
are reciprocated, additionally confirming the low degree of mutual trust, and 
accordingly social capital among the dairy farmers. In addition to the 
fragmentation and localized characteristics of the farmer’s relations, the 
network shows that the important agricultural decisions among the dairy 
farmers in the country are based largely on relations among dairy farmers 
which belong to the same ethnic group. This confirms the assumption that 
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extended trust in informal networks (kinship, friendship, belonging to same 
groups) remained undamaged even during the period of centrally-planned 
economy, However, economic growth and improvement of farmers’ position in 
the value chain require trust in formally institutionalized cooperation and 
involvement in civic organizations which contribute to economic growth more 
than these informal, local networks (Raiser et al., 2002). 
4.4 Paper IV: Institutional mismatch in a transition economy. 
The collapse of Swedmilk Macedonia 
Foreign investment is said to be the “engine of change” in restructuring 
processes in transition countries. By initiating a variety of more sophisticated 
models of vertical coordination, foreign investors not only introduce capital, 
but also know-how. As a case study, the aim of this part of the research was to 
present the reasons behind the failure of the only green-field FDI in the dairy 
processing industry in FYR Macedonia. The in-depth investigation revealed 
that there were many malfunctions in the institutional setting which enabled the 
dairy representatives to manipulate and use the information asymmetries in 
order to extract individual benefits. Poor institutions carried high-agency costs 
for most of the parties in the Swedmilk case. In a one year period, this 
investment managed to lose all its equity capital and accumulate enormous 
debt towards all its shareholders, with largest impact on the dairy farmers and 
the dairy industry in the country. The main points and problems in each phase 
of the Swedmilk dairy bankruptcy case are presented in Table 8. 
Table 8. Main events in the development of the Swedmilk dairy bankruptcy case 
Time Event 
November 29, 2007 Test of the production facilities, 10 metric tons milk per day are purchased 
from farmers 
March 2008 70 metric tons of milk per day are purchased from farmers 
May 2008 Beginning of the delayed payment for the purchased milk 
August 2008 Escalation of the problems. Blockades and protests by farmers 
May-October 2008 Stock of 2.5 million metric tons of unsold products 
November 2008 Conflicts between the shareholders in the company 
December 2008 Farmers demand state intervention to prevent collapse of the dairy sector 
February 2009 Fenix Energy becomes the owner of Swedmilk 
May 2009 Bankruptcy procedure starts with 25 million euros of equity capital lost and 
a debt of 37.5 million euros, of which 3.5 million euros to 2,500 farmers 
 
The Managing Director of Swedmilk was a man of Swedish origin who was 
well acquainted with the dairy industry in the Balkan countries, because of the 
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previous working experience in the ex-Yugoslavian countries and Romania. 
Swedfund (Swedish Governmental fund with the task of creating economic 
development through investments in developing economies) was also one of 
Swedmilk’s principals. However, the decision makers at Swedfund had no 
experience of the business conditions in FYR Macedonia or in the dairy 
industry. Hence their decision to support the project proposal was mainly based 
on trust in the businessmen’s who wanted to establish Swedmilk. Swedfund’s 
investment in Swedmilk may be seen from a resource-based point of view (Das 
and Teng, 2000). According to the resource-based approach, the value of a 
specific type of resource such as capital is dependent upon the other resources 
with which it is combined. The Swedmilk project combined Swedfund’s 
capital with resources from private investors, which in uncertain environments 
and weakly regulated institutional and legal settings open possibilities for 
opportunism. The agents in such case would be able to redirect some of the 
rents to themselves, which was one of the primary problems for the Swedmilk 
investment partnership. Ultimately it was the private investors who exploited 
this investment. 
The part-Swedish ownership raised the reputation and increased the trust in 
the success of this FDI. The “Swedish” image was successfully used by the 
owners to obtain credits from the local banks. Therefore the intentions to invest 
in a modern dairy processing plant that would satisfy EU standards and 
increase the competitive environment on the market appeared to be realistic. 
By making large investments in processing facilities, Swedmilk signalled its 
serious intentions for long-term presence in the FYR Macedonia’s dairy 
industry. The attractive and partly unrealistic prices and favourable contracting 
conditions attracted dairy farmers to become partners of the dairy, and also 
motivated them to invest in their dairy operations and improve the breeding 
structure and increase herd size.  
New Institutional Economic theories emphasize the importance of trust for 
the transactions. Trust in trustworthy people can reduce agency and transaction 
costs, while trust in untrustworthy people can increase these costs. However, in 
Swedmilk’s case, Swedfund became aware of the acuteness of the situation 
only after it was too late and the financial problems became too large. The 
investment in the FYR Macedonian dairy industry by Swedfund was also risky 
in the sense that several of the major dairy processing firms in Europe operate 
in FYR Macedonia through partnering firms, with the important actors in the 
European dairy industry considering the institutional environment to be too 
risky, too small, or otherwise not an attractive country to invest in. It can be 
also concluded that the underdeveloped institutional and legal framework in 
the country made contract enforcement costly and inconsistent, and did not 
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protect farmers from being exploited by such endeavours. The mass media in 
FYR Macedonia accused a top politician of being involved in corruption 
(Government, 2009). Corruption is also linked to a country’s judicial and 
executive governance malfunctioning, which in FYR Macedonia is weak, 
unclear, and often not implemented. This not only left space for financial 
failure of this magnitude to happen, but also failed to protect the farmers’ other 
stakeholders’ investments. The investments on farm level were acknowledged, 
but not officially supported, by Swedmilk, thus the farmers in the country 
faced problems repaying their loans to the banks, and their trust in the dairy 
processing industry was very much reduced. The Swedmilk dairy failure has 
possibly created a chain reaction and long-term problems for the dairy value 
chain in the country. 
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5 Discussion and conclusions 
The aim of this thesis was to reveal the organization and institutional problems 
of the dairy industry/supply chain in FYR Macedonia, which obstructed the 
restructuring, the institutional development as well as its competitive position 
and potentials. The analyses followed New Institutional Economics and 
Institutional Organization theories to approach these problems from different 
angles and in this way obtain larger validity of the results. In general most of 
the problems in the dairy industry originate from the institutional 
underdevelopments, caused and inherited by the previous socialist system that 
the country was part of until 1991. The institutional deficiencies cause problem 
on every level of the dairy supply chain, and posed a serious treat for its 
competitiveness. Therefore addressing the question of the country’s agriculture 
competitiveness from a value chain perspective is valuable, since the 
competitiveness of each stage will affect the prospects for the remaining stages 
in the chain (Gorton and White, 2006).  
At farm level, the dairy farmers experienced great turbulences during the 
long transition that FYR Macedonia is going through, with most of the 
competitiveness problems of the dairy industry situated in this segment of the 
chain. Dairy farming in the country is small-scaled, extensive and traditional 
(Paper I), and in order for the dairy value chain to gain a competitive edge, the 
focus in the future will be on developing larger, commercial farms which will 
improve the productivity on farm level as well the productivity and 
competitiveness of the sector (Lampietti et al., 2009). At the moment farm’s 
small size and absence of cooperation (the dairy farmers do not take 
participation in any farm associations, nor are forming dairy cooperatives) 
limits their efficiency in terms of production and transacting costs. The main 
presumption in this respect is that in absence of institutionalized forms of 
cooperation as in this case, informal networks are utilized for information and 
technology exchange. The social network analyses in paper III confirm that 
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dairy farmers are still reluctant and distrustful towards any form of institutional 
cooperation; years after the beginning of the transition. Because of their small 
size as well as the recognized benefits from cooperation the dairy farmers will 
need to change their unconstructive attitudes towards cooperation in order to 
facilitate growth and competitiveness, and improve their position in the value 
chain. This situation also limits the motive of the dairy processors to provide 
closer vertical coordination which is also necessary in order to improve 
farmers’ willingness to invest in modernized production of milk (Paper I). 
Farmers’ unwillingness to invest in asset specific/specialized breeds and 
equipment is based on the fact that in this way they are exposed on risk of 
opportunism from the dairies. This was confirmed in the empirical results in 
Paper II, which suggest that specialized breeds increase the possibility for dairy 
farmers to have contracts with the dairies. However, farmers which undertake 
asset specific investments such as recent investment in farm, enter a lock-in 
situation which gives dairy processors an advantage and possibility for 
opportunistic behaviour. On the other hand, because of the high asset specific 
investments the larger dairy processing capacities would prefer contracts in 
order to assure the required quantities of milk and reach optimal utilization of 
their capacities.  
In order for dairy farming to provide quality supply base for the dairy of the 
supply chain, there is need for larger consolidation in this segment of the chain. 
At the moment, dairy farming provides employment for considerable number 
of farmers in the rural areas, but its small-scale results in higher costs for 
production and transaction. This is leading to higher prices of raw milk and 
lower quality for production of special value added dairy products (threat of 
substitution). Furthermore, the natural resources for dairy farming are 
favourable but insufficiently employed. From 2008, certain governmental 
policies are introduced, aimed to promote development, modernization and 
competitiveness (both in quality and quantity terms) of dairy farming. However 
government support acts only as a social measure so far, with no viewable 
contribution on the structural restructuring and modernization of the chain.  
Regardless of their small size, dairy farmers do not trust institutional 
cooperation. Instead they utilize their close relations for information and 
technology exchange, however only localized within the village communities 
and few relations outside their immediate surrounding (high network 
fragmentation). Dairy farmers discuss important agricultural matters within 
their immediate surrounding and also within people that they share the same 
characteristics, such as belong to the same ethnic group. 
The dairies may also serve as mediators in connecting dairy farmers, and in 
this way reducing their transacting and production costs. The surveyed farmers 
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perceive dairies as their major source of market information, and their position 
in the network gives them the possibility and the power to regulate the 
informational flow. 
During the restructuring of the agri-food supply chains in transition 
countries, the processing and retailing segments begun with the concentration 
processes. This process might further distance farmers from the final 
consumers, and posed a potential danger of monopsonies (Gorton and White, 
2006). The concentration measures which were used to demonstrate the market 
competition trough the shares of retail sales of the companies present on the 
market indicate to a relatively competitive situation in the dairy industry in 
FYR Macedonia. The market for milk and dairy products is moderately 
concentrated, with higher levels of concentration in the market for liquid milk, 
and lower for the dairy products, which are mainly imported and not provided 
by the domestic dairy processors. Larger processors are more adoptive in terms 
of technological and institutional innovation, and offer wider range of 
products. They also have easier access to raw materials (from the perspective 
of a buyer of milk for further processing) and accordingly a better bargaining 
power, as well as an established distributive network. Ensuring stable milk 
supply in this way provides optimal capacity utilization is imperative for 
attaining market shares and competitiveness on the market. This necessitates 
the need to develop closer relation with the farmers as their supplying partners. 
At the moment, vertical coordination in the chain is achieved by contracts, 
which are expected to offer security and positive environment for investments 
and modernization along the value chain (Barrett et al., 2001). The analyses of 
the market structure and size indicate that further consolidation of the 
processing capacities will contribute for decreased costs of production and 
increased competitiveness primarily in the domestic market. The largest dairies 
in the country have established certain brand loyalty in the domestic 
consumers, and brand loyalty is a way to increase and maintain market shares.  
FDI is important source of investments and spill-over effects, introducing 
new competitiveness strategies and motivating domestic firms to modernize 
and upgrade in order to remain their competitive position on the market. 
Nevertheless, in cases of institutional uncertainties, FDI can also have an 
opposite effect and impede the development of the entire industry. The 
important improvements in the political and socio-economic conditions, lead to 
certain FDI attraction mainly in the downstream segment of the dairy value 
chain in FYR Macedonia, with two of the three largest processors in the 
country becoming part of well-known international food companies in the past 
two decades. The dairy retail structure is also fragmented and milk and dairy 
distribution is still largely performed by small grocery shops. In accordance to 
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the market size and fragmentation, there are only two regional retail chains 
present on the food market in the country. Therefore, there is still no 
willingness from the dairy processors or the large retailers to invest backward 
in the value chain in order to improve their supply base and in this way 
increase the competitiveness of the entire industry.  
The institutional environment occurred as an important determinant for the 
structure and indicator for the level of development of the dairy industry in 
FYR Macedonia. The fact that institutional underdevelopment still allows for 
informal contracts to exist, proves that the institutional setting in the sector is 
still uncertain. Even when contracts are present to regulate the vertical relations 
(transactions) between dairy farmers and dairy processors, they are unable to 
safe-guard the necessary asset specific an investment in the dairy sector and 
this substantially delays its anticipated progress (Paper II). This was confirmed 
with the Swedmilk dairy, which offered farmers notable contracts and 
contracting terms and encouraged them to invest in their farms and dairy 
breeds. With the Swedmilk dairy’s bankruptcy, the contracts could not be 
enforced, leaving farmers with large debts and even larger mistrust in the value 
of contracts. The failure of Swedmilk seems to be the result mainly of the 
institutional settings in the country being inappropriate for foreign direct 
investments and the operations of a western-style firm. While this firm had 
several good elements, it failed due to inappropriate institutions both within its 
own organizational structure (ownership structure, management skills, network 
of collaboration partner, etc.) and in its business environment (dairy farmers, 
the country’s legal system, government action, demands from creditors, 
behavior of Swedfund) (Paper IV). The Swedmilk failure has possibly created 
long-term problems for FYR Macedonia. There has been a chain reaction in the 
dairy industry. Many farmers experienced bankruptcy because of the 
investments they made, encouraged by Swedmilk. The investments on farm 
level were acknowledged, but not officially supported, by Swedmilk, thus 
farmers faced problems repaying their loans to the banks, and their trust in the 
dairy processing industry is low. 
A general conclusion would be that due to the institutional and 
organizational deficiencies, the dairy industry in FYR Macedonia is still under 
its competitive potential, and its development lags behind the consolidation 
processes that occurred in the post-socialist countries during the 1990’s. 
Regardless of the favourable factor endowments, small-scaled and fragmented 
farm structure is the primary problem for the dairy farmers’ competitive 
position in the value chain, but also in terms of access to inputs (raw milk) for 
the actors in the downstream segment. There is a competitive environment in 
the processing segment of milk and dairy products. However, due to the slow 
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consolidation of the retail sector, as well as the small size of the market for 
cow milk and dairy products, the large number of small dairy processors will 
need to either merge or specialize in order to strengthen their position in the 
dairy industry. In general the market structure and rate of development indicate 
that the dairy industry in the country requires further modernization and 
consolidation in order to reach its competitiveness potentials on both domestic 
and international markets.  
5.1 Contribution of the thesis 
This thesis represents the first attempt to perform complete competitiveness 
analysis in the dairy supply chain in FYR Macedonia. All of the papers are 
using different theoretical approach to access the competitiveness levels on 
each segment in the industry, as well characterize the institutional environment 
which shapes the organizational structure, level of development and 
competitive prospects. The analysis of the transaction costs specifics that 
influence the governance of the transactions between the dairy farmers and 
their processing partners in FYR Macedonia can considerably add to the 
knowledge on the contracting patterns in countries wedged in a long transition, 
and could easily transfer to the experiences in the countries from the Western 
Balkan region. The findings are a valuable source of information for all the 
actors in the dairy supply chain, since it provides information of each actor’s 
position in the supply chain, the market structure, and the development of the 
chain in general. Special contribution can be found in the Social Network 
analysis part of the thesis, which is one of the first attempts to identify the 
patterns of social capital in post-socialist, Balkan countries. Mapping of these 
relations serves as an initial point for further research and discussion on the 
topic of farmer’s informal social structures and the way they can be activated 
or transformed into formalized cooperation or systems for information 
exchange on a wider level - outside the local communities and ethnic groups. 
The research can also serve as basic information for the real postulates on 
which agricultural cooperatives can be founded in countries with similar 
socialistic background, instead of the constant efforts to enforce western 
cooperative models which were proved to be inapplicable for countries with 
complex background and social capital relations.  
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